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Abstract 
We consider the problem of belief aggrega­
tion: given a group of individual agents with 
probabilistic beliefs over a set of of uncer­
tain events, formulate a sensible consensus or 
aggregate probability distribution over these 
events. Researchers have proposed many ag­
gregation methods, although on the ques­
tion of which is best the general consensus 
is that there is no consensus. We develop 
a market-based approach to this problem, 
where agents bet on uncertain events by buy­
ing or selling securities contingent on their 
outcomes. Each agent acts in the market so 
as to maximize expected utility at given secu­
rities prices, limited in its activity only by its 
own risk aversion. The equilibrium prices of 
goods in this market represent aggregate be­
liefs. For agents with constant risk aversion, 
we demonstrate that the aggregate probabil­
ity exhibits several desirable properties, and 
is related to independently motivated tech­
niques. We argue that the market-based ap­
proach provides a plausible mechanism for 
belief aggregation in multi agent systems, as it 
directly addresses self-motivated agent incen­
tives for participation and for truthfulness, 
and can provide a decision-theoretic founda­
tion for the "expert weights" often employed 
in centralized pooling techniques. 
1 BELIEF AGGREGATION 
The problem of belief aggregation is to derive a sum­
mary representation of a group's beliefs as a function 
of the beliefs of its constituent agents. The problem 
is a classic one in statistics, and it has also been well­
studied in decision analysis. Despite the interest it has 
garnered [Benediktsson and Swain, 1992; French, 1985; 
Genest and Zidek, 1986; Ng and Abramson, 1992; 
Ng and Abramson, 1994; Weerahandi and Zidek, 1981; 
West, 1984], the problem has eluded definitive an­
swers, and the plethora of impossibility results [Hyl­
land and Zeckha.user, 1979; Genest and Zidek, 1986; 
Saari, 1995] and definitional controversies [French, 
1985] in the literature cast doubt on the prospects for 
an entirely satisfactory solution. 
Nevertheless, there are common situations in which a 
collection of agents may wish to aggregate their beliefs. 
As an example, a. group of doctors with disparate sub­
jective beliefs evaluating the probabilities of diseases 
may benefit from a formal method for combining their 
opinions (especially if their advice is to be culled into a 
probabilistic expert system [Ng and Abramson, 1992]). 
In more general terms, as trends toward decentraliza­
tion in computation continue, aggregation mechanisms 
are likely to play an increasing role in uncertain rea­
soning. Software agents representing distinct interests 
and possessing individual knowledge and information­
gathering capabilities will form their own beliefs, and 
no overarching authority will be technically or compu­
tationally able to gather all of the relevant informa­
tion centrally, obtain permission to access all agents' 
beliefs and preferences, or enforce any globally con­
sistent consensus. If we wish to gain the benefits of 
others' knowledge, we need to induce them to provide 
relevant reports, or perform other actions that will re­
veal the information we seek. 
From this perspective, paramount in the design of a 
belief aggregation mechanism are the incentives it pro­
vides to agents to reveal their private beliefs. Given 
some behavioral assumptions on the participants, we 
aim to characterize the aggregation function "com­
puted" by the mechanism, that is, the relationship of 
the derived summary to the agents' individual beliefs. 
In this work, we investigate the behavior of a partic­
ular approach to belief aggregation, based on markets 
in uncertain propositions. The idea is that agents' de­
cisions to trade in such markets will be driven by their 
beliefs and utility, and therefore the resulting prices 
in the markets will reflect private information bear­
ing on the likelihood of the propositions. Agents in 
the market have to back up their stated positions with 
real money, and so have tangible disincentives to lie as 
well as positive incentives to participate and to gather 
all cost-effective relevant information. 
2 MARKETS IN UNCERTAIN 
PROPOSITIONS 
Our basic approach is to set up markets for uncertain 
propositions, essentially financial securities that pay 
off in monetary units contingent on uncertain events. 
Agents bid on these propositions according to their 
beliefs and preference for money. In equilibrium, the 
market prices can be interpreted as an aggregate prob­
ability of the participants in the market. Because each 
market in equilibrium balances supply and demand, 
the mechanism requires no subsidy, and the only cost 
of obtaining the aggregate belief information is that of 
organizing and running the markets. In other words, 
we do not have to pay the agents directly for revealing 
their information. 
Let f2 denote the sample space, and capital letters 
near the beginning of the alphabet (A, B, C, . . . , each 
a proper subset of n), events of possible interest. 
Each agent has a probability distribution Pr over 0, 
which defines its probabilities over events of interest, 
Pr(A) = LweA Pr(w). With each such event A, we 
associate a security, worth $1 if A obtains, and zero 
otherwise. When the interpretation is clear by con­
text, we may refer to the security "$1 if A" simply by 
its corresponding event A. 
A quantity z of security A can be interpreted as a 
lottery resulting in $z if and only if (iff) A obtains. If 
the agent must pay a price p per unit of the security, 
then a decision to buy x units is equivalent to the 
lottery L(x) = [Pr(A), (1-p)x; -px], with payoff (1-
p )x if A occurs, and -px otherwise. 
Let u denote the agent's utility function for dollars. 
We can define the agent's utility, U, for purchasing 
quantities of the security, in terms of u, 
U(x) = E[u(L(x))] 
Pr(A)u((l- p)z) + (1- Pr(A))u(-p.x). 
For the case of multiple securities, let W = {A, B, ... } 
denote the set of events of interest. Let :cz represent 
the quantity purchased (or sold, if zZ < 0) of security 
Z, for Z E W, and pz its associated price. The utility 
of such a bundle can also be expressed in terms of 
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probabilities over n and utility for money, 
U(xA , x8, ... ) = 
L Pr(w)u( L xz- L p2 xz). (1) 
wen ZEW:wEZ ZEW 
Given these beliefs and preferences, and a few be­
havioral assumptions, we can define the interaction 
of an agent in the security markets. Specifically, we 
assume that each agent behaves competitively, max­
imizing utility (1) at a given set of prices. We also 
make several additional assumptions: 
1. Preferences for dollars (represented by u) do not 
depend on the uncertain state. 
2. Agents do not change beliefs based on prices. 
That is, they do not consider that prices might re­
veal relevant private information of other agents.1 
3. Agents are risk averse [Keeney and Raiffa, 1976; 
Pratt, 1964] for dollars, that is, u is an ill'creasing 
concave function. 
The first two assumptions (along with competitive be­
havior) are implicit in the agent's optimization prob­
lem (1). Concavity of u entails concavity of U, and 
hence any critical point of (1) is a global maximum. 
To ensure bounded solutions, we also generally assume 
Pr(w) > 0, for allw E 0. Ifu is sufficiently risk averse, 
then the optimization problem is guaranteed to have 
a bounded solution for prices consistent with the log­
ical structure of events. 2 Prices are consistent iff any 
combination of securities-one unit purchased or sold 
of each-loses money in at least one possible outcome. 
The upshot of these assumptions is that each agent 
agrees to participate in the market and has sufficient 
incentive (through monetary payoffs) to make deci­
sions according to its true beliefs. Our emphasis on 
explicit truth incentives is in contrast to most belief 
aggregation approaches, which instead merely stipu­
late that agents be honest. In the usual opinion pool­
ing procedures, moreover, agents directly reveal their 
entire subjective probability distribution; in our model 
agents reveal this information only implicitly through 
their purchase and sale of securities. 
Let the agent's demand function, x(p) {.xA (p), :c8 (p ), ... } , represent the quantities of securi­
ties maximizing utility (1) at prices p = {pA ,p8, ... ). 
1 Since all of our results refer to equilibrium properties, 
these could just as well be interpreted in terms of beliefs 
poderior to information revealed through prices. 
2 Although we have not yet characterized the most gen­
eral conditions, limy-oo u1(y) == 0 is sufficient. Note that 
constant risk aversion, considered in detail below, ha.s this 
property. 
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When there are multiple agents, we denote the 
demand, utility, and probability functions of agent 
i by x;, u;, and Pr;, respectively. A market system 
with N agents is in competitive equilibrium at prices 
piff 
N 
I:xt(P) = 0. 
i=l 
The competitive equilibrium prices in the economy 
represent the aggregate beliefs of the participants. 
The remainder of this paper develops our market­
based approach to belief aggregation in more detail. 
The next section considers individual behavior-how 
each agent determines its demand for available secu­
rities by maximizing utility. In Section 4 we examine 
the equilibrium prices that arise from the agents' in­
teractions in the market. We discuss some previous 
proposals for market-based aggregation and other re­
lated work in Section 5, and conclude by summarizing 
our results and previewing future directions. 
3 DEMAND FOR SECURITIES 
The central decision facing each agent is how much 
of each security to demand, where positive demand 
indicates a quantity to buy, negative demand to sell. 
It acts in order to maximize expected utility, which 
leads to bounded behavior as long the agent is risk 
averse and prices are consistent. If prices are incon­
sistent (for example, the summed prices for a set of 
exhaustive events is less than one), then it is possi­
ble to identify a combination of securities that does 
not lose money in any possible outcome. This situa­
tion provides an opportunity for arbitrage [N au and 
McCardle, 1991]-the portfolio can be replicated to 
increase utility ( 1) without bound. We exhibit some 
examples of unbounded behavior for logically related 
goods below. 
We can derive specific conclusions about the demand 
behavior of agents and the resulting equilibrium prices 
under the assumption that agents adopt a particular 
form of utility function. In particular, all of our closed­
form results assume that agents' preferences for money 
obey constant risk aversion, which implies that the 
agent's utility for dollars is given by 
u(y) = -e-cy' 
where cis the agent's risk aversion coefficient [Keeney 
and Raiffa, 1976; Pratt, 1964]. 
We illustrate the agent's demand behavior for the spe­
cial cases of one and two securities in Sections 3.1 
and 3.2, and briefly consider the case of multiple secu­
rities in Section 3.3. 
3.1 ONE SECURITY 
Suppose an individual must decide what quantity, x, 
of a single security, "$1 if A", to buy or sell. The 
price is p, and the agent believes that the event will 
occur with probability Pr(A). The market in "$1 if A" 
is essentially a lottery L(x) with payoff (1- p)x if A 
occurs, and -px otherwise. 
The agent's utility (1) for purchasing x units of the 
security is the expected utility of the lottery, 
U(x) E[u(L(x))] 
= Pr(A)u((1- p)x) + Pr(A)u(-px). (2) 
The optimal demand must satisfy the first-order con­
dition U'(x) = 0, yielding: 
Pr(A) '(( ) ) p 
, 
Pr(A)
u 1- p x =(
1
- p)
u (-px). (3) 
Proposition 1 (Qualitative Single-Good De­
mand) A risk-averse agent's demand for a single se­
curity is positive (zero, negative) if its probability for 
the corresponding event is greater than (equal to, less 
than} the security's price. 
Proof. From the first-order condition (3), Pr(A) > p 
implies u'(-px) > u'((l- p)x). Since risk aversion 
entails decreasing marginal utility, the latter inequality 
holds iff x > 0. Analogous arguments establish the 
zero and negative-demand cases. D 
For agents with constant risk aversion, the utility (2) 
becomes 
U(x) = E[u(L(x))] = - Pr(A)e-c(l-p)x- Pr(A)ecpx. 
In this instance, solving the first-order condition (3) 
yields a closed form for the optimal demand, 
(4) 
As Proposition 1 dictates, the agent's demand is di­
rectly related to its belief in the probability of A, 
and inversely related to the price of the good. At 
p = Pr(A), its demand is zero.3 As an agent's risk 
aversion approaches zero (approximating risk neutral­
ity) it is willing to buy or sell increasing amounts of 
the good, assuming the price is not equal to its belief. 
In a sense, a smaller risk aversion indicates greater 
31£ we relax our assumption that Pr(w) > 0, demand 
may become unbounded. This poses a computational prob­
lem, but does not violate rationality-if you are absolutely 
certain of the outcome of an event you should be willing 
to bet arbitrarily large amounts on that eventuality, inde­
pendent of risk aversion. 
confidence in beliefs; the agent is willing to put more 
on the line when it thinks the price is too low or high. 
As demonstrated below, risk aversion plays the role 
in our model that "expert weights" play in common 
pooling procedures, encoding some sort of confidence, 
reliability, or importance factor for each individual. 
3.2 TWO SECURITIES 
Next we consider the slightly more general case of two 
uncertain events A and B, and two corresponding se­
curities "$1 if A" and "$1 if B". The going prices are 
pA and p8, and the agent's demands are xA and x8. 
The market in these two goods is essentially a lottery 
L(xA, x8) with a payoff depending on how much the 
agent purchases at what price, and on the outcome 
of the events A and B. Following the progression of 
Section 3.1, the utility for the two securities is the ex­
pected utility of this lottery, which for constant risk 
aversion is given by 
U(xA, x8) = E[u(L(xA, x8))] = 
- Pr(AB)e-c[(1-pA)zA+(1-p
B)zB] 
- Pr(AB)e-e[(l-pA)
zA-pBzB] 
- Pr(AB)e-c[ -
pAzA+(l-pB)zB] 
- Pr(AB)e-e[-p
AzA-pBzBJ. (5) 
The decision variables in this optimization problem 
are coupled; optimal demand for A may depend on 
the demand for B, and thus on the price of B. Fig­
ure 1 graphs utility (5) as a function of xA and x8 
for a particular instantiation of beliefs, risk coefficient, 
and prices. Although we do not have a closed form 
for optimal demand {except in special cases; see the 
treatment of mutually exclusive events below, and also 
Proposition 2), the problem is solvable numerically. 
The utility function (5) is unimodal, and optimization 
techniques such as Newton's method are well behaved. 
We can also implicitly represent the maximum of (5) 
as follows: 
Using these equations we can numerically compute the 
optimum by starting at {xA,x8} = {0,0} and iter­
atively plugging the results back into the equations, 
until the process converges to a desired accuracy. The 
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Figure 1: Utility (5) versus xA and x8 for the param­
eters Pr(AB) = Pr(AB) = Pr(AB) = Pr(A.B) = 0.25, 
pA = p8 = 0.5, and c = 1. Utility is a maximum 
at {xA,x8} = {0,0}, as expected when price equals 
belief. 
above implicit form is also useful for examining in more 
detail some of the properties of an agent's demand be­
havior for the case of two goods. 
Proposition 2 (Separation of Independent 
Events) If the agent believes that the two events A 
and B are independe nt, then the optimization problem 
is separable with respect to xA and x8, and each 
reduces to the single-good case { 4). 
Proof. If the agent believes that A and B are inde­
pendent, then (6) becomes 
XA = 
-ln 1 ( (1- pA) P
r(A) 
[
Pr(B)e-0"'8 + Pr(B)] ) 
c pA Pr(A) (Pr(B)e-""'8 + Pr(B)] 
= � In ((1- pA) Pr(A) ) ' 
c pA Pr(A) 
and similarly for x8. 0 
When the events are dependent, demand for the two 
goods are correlated in the opposite direction of the 
dependence. 
Proposition 3 (Demand Correlation for Depen­
dent Events) Demand xA is increasing in x8 when 
Pr(AIB) 
< 
Pr(AIB) . The opposite relation holds when 
Pr(AIB) > Pr(AIB). 
Proof. By examining (6) and (7), we see that xA and 
x8 are positively correlated when 
Pr(AB) Pr(AB) 
Pr(AB) < Pr(AB) 
Pr(AIB) Pr(AIB) 
Pr(AIB) < Pr(AIB) 
Pr(AIB) < Pr(AIB). 
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The proof of the condition for negative correlation is 
analogous. Proposition 2 establishes zero correlation 
in the boundary case. D 
One way to interpret this result is that negatively 
correlated goods provide insurance for each other, 
whereas positively related events increase the exposed 
risk. Put another way, positively related goods are 
(partial) substitutes, whereas negatively related goods 
are complementary. Demand correlations occur be­
cause both securities pay off in a common currency 
(dollars) for which agents are risk-averse. 
The extreme case of negative correlation ( complemen­
tarity) is disjoint events. For a pair of mutually ex­
clusive but not exhaustive securities, we can solve (6) 
and (7) in closed form. 
A 
11 ( (1-pA-p8)Pr(A) ) x = � n pA(l- Pr(A)- Pr(B)) ' (8) 
and similarly for x8. The solution assumes pA + p8 < 
1, for if this were not the case, the agent could achieve 
unbounded utility by selling infinite amounts of both 
securities. Such opportunities are always possible for 
logically related events, if the prices are not consistent. 
For example, consider the case of two securities repre­
senting equivalent events, A= B. If pA :/= p8, then the 
path to unbounded utility is to buy infinite amounts of 
the cheaper security to sell in the higher priced market. 
If the prices coincide, then the agent acts as if there 
were a single security, splitting demand arbitrarily. 
Proposition 4 (Equivalent Events) Suppose A = 
B and pA = p8. Then the sum of optimal demands, 
xA + x8, equals the demand for the single good A at 
price pA. 
Proof. If A = B, then (6) becomes: 
xA = ! In ( (1 - PA) Pr(A)e-
c21s ) 
c pA Pr(A) 
! ln ((1- pA) Pr(A)) - xB 
c pA Pr(A) 
= DA -xB, 
where D A is the single-good demand for A at price 
pA ( 4). Similarly, x8 = Dn - xA. If pA = p8, then 
xA + zB = D A = DB. D 
Figures 2 and 3 graph expected utility (5) versus xA 
and x8 for the above situation, A = B. The former 
illustrates the case when pA = p8, the latter when 
pA > pB. 
Proposition 5 (Complementary Events) Sup­
pose A = B. If pA + p8 = 1, then xA - x8 equals 
the demand for the single good A at price pA. 
V(x•A,x"B) 
Figure 2: Utility (5) versus -;:A and x8 for the parame­
ters Pr(AB) = Pr(AiJ) = 0.5, Pr(AB) = Pr(AB) = 0, 
pA = p8 = 0.5 and c = 1. In this case A= B. Utility 
is a maximum along the line xA + x8 = 0; the agent's 
total demand for A = B is zero, but it will split its 
purchases arbitrarily between the equivalent markets. 
Figure 3: Utility (5) versus xA and x8 for the parame­
ters Pr(AB) = Pr(AiJ) = 0.5, Pr(AB) = Pr(AB) = 0, 
pA = 0.7, p8 = 0.3, and c = 1. The prices are incon­
sistent with the logical relationship A = B, and the 
agent maximizes utility by selling A and buying B in 
infinite quantities. 
Proof. Analogous to Proposition 4. D 
Note that prices inconsistent with the logical struc­
ture of events cannot be part of an equilibrium, as 
the agents will choose infinite demands. Indeed, if any 
agent believes this to be the case (i.e., the agent takes 
some primitive events to be impossible, while others 
do not), then that agent will effectively dictate such a 
relationship in the aggregate probability. 
3.3 MULTIPLE SECURITIES 
The basic principles developed above for the one­
and two-good case carry over to larger numbers of 
events and their corresponding securities. Any set of 
events that are independent from the remaining events 
may be handled separately. In general, for dependent 
events, the demands will be correlated. The properties 
of logically related securities remain valid. 
It is a straightforward task to write down each agent's 
expected utility for multiple securities, although the 
number of terms may be exponential in the number 
of events. Since the utility function is concave in se­
curities, simple numeric maximization methods such 
as gradient descent or Newton's method should work 
well. 
4 EQUILIBRIUM PRICES AND 
CONSENSUS BELIEFS 
We next examine how the collective decisions of a 
group of agents affect the market's equilibrium prices. 
These prices are interpreted as the group consensus or 
aggregate belief in the probabilities of the associated 
uncertain events. In Section 4. 1 we investigate in detail 
the case of one security, and obtain some closed-form 
results. In Section 4.2, we discuss the general situation 
of multiple events and securities. 
4.1 ONE SECURITY 
When a group of N agents with constant risk aversion 
bid on a single security, "$1 if A", we can solve directly 
in closed form for the competitive equilibrium price. 
The market is in equilibrium when 2:�1 xi(P) = 0, 
where each Xi(P) is the single good demand function 
(4) for agent i. Solving this equation for p, we obtain 
where a, = (1/ci)/ Lj(1/ci ). Pr, and Ci represent the 
beliefs and risk aversion, respectively, of agent i. 
Perhaps surprisingly, the competitive equilibrium 
price (9) turns out to be a normalized form of the 
logarithmic opinion pool (LogOP) for a single event. 
This standard form (essentially a geometric mean) has 
appeared prominently in the belief-aggregation liter­
ature [Dalkey, 1975; French, 1985; Weerahandi and 
Zidek, 1981; West, 1984]. Our market model, there­
fore, provides one way to ground a well-known central­
ized pooling mechanism in terms of individual behav­
wr. 
It also provides a decision-theoretic interpretation for 
the notoriously slippery concept of "expert weights". 
In the usual interpretation, the exponents in {9) en­
code some sort of degree of expertise, confidence, or 
reliability, and are almost always chosen in an ad hoc 
manner [Benediktsson and Swain, 1992; French, 1985; 
Genest and Zidek, 1986; Ng and Abramson, 1994]. In 
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arguing against the use of opinion pools, French [1985J 
presents as his first reason that 
. .. they all introduce weights ... which are 
not operationally defined. How should they 
be chosen? To say that one expert is twice as 
good as another is a figure of speech, not an 
arithmetic statement. The problem is further 
complicated by the likelihood of correlation 
between the expert's [sic] opinions. Several 
pragmatic solutions have been proposed ... , 
but to my knowledge none avoid a certain 
arbitrariness. 
In our model, the derived weights are a normalized in­
verse measure of risk aversion, a;= (1/c;)/E;(lfci)· 
Note also that the weights sum to unity, as is the stan­
dard convention. Finally, allowing agents with other 
forms of risk aversion (other than constant) suggests 
a natural way to generalize the normalized LogOP. 
The equilibrium price for a single security has several 
desirable or otherwise interesting properties as an ag­
gregate assessment of a probability. We list them here 
without proof, as they all follow simply or have been 
observed elsewhere in the context of LogOPs. 
• min Pr;(A) :S p :S max Pri(A) 
• If all agents agree that Pr;(A) = k, then p = k. 
Note that this property follows from the previous. 
• If Pr,(A) increases (decreases) and Prj(A) for j # 
i remains fixed, then p increases (decreases). 
• As c; - 0 (agent i becomes more risk neutral or 
more confident) and CJ remains a positive con­
stant for j # i, p- Pr,(A). 
• If all risk aversion coefficients are multiplied by a 
positive constant , p does not change. 
• If a set of agent beliefs Pr; (A) leads to an equi­
librium price P*, then the set of agent beliefs 
1 - Pr,(A) leads to an equilibrium price 1 - P*· 
Often in belief aggregation work it is desirable to show 
that the group as a whole behaves rationally in some 
sense. The following proposition establishes such a 
characteristic in our system, for the case of a single 
event. 
Proposition 6 (Equivalent "super-agent" ) 
Suppose a group of N agents with beliefs 
Pr1(A), ... , PrN (A) and risk aversion coefficients 
c1 , ... , CN effect an equilibrium price P*· Their aggre­
gate {total) demand is equal to the demand of a single 
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representative "super-agent" with belief Pr(A) = P* 
and risk aversion c such that 1/c = (1/c1 + ... + 1/cN). 
Proof. From (4), the super-agent's demand is: 
x = ! In ( (1- p) P* ) . c p (1- P*) 
Substituting the RHS of (9) for the equilibrium price 
p*, we get: 
0 
To an outside observer, this super-agent behaves as 
a rational "individual" in exactly the same sense as 
delineated for single agents in Section 3-the aggre­
gate behavior can be rationalized as maximization of 
expected utility (with constant risk aversion, at that). 
In the same way, any subset of the agents can be aggre­
gated according to Proposition 6, interacting with the 
rest of the system in a manner indistinguishable from 
an individual's behavior. Moreover, for any group of 
agents (assuming finite positive c; ) the super-agent 
risk aversion is strictly less than that of any individual. 
Thus the group as a whole is willing to take on more 
risk, acting in some sense with more "confidence" than 
any member alone. 
4.2 MULTIPLE SECURITIES 
The analysis is more difficult for markets in multiple 
securities. In general, the price of one good will depend 
on the prices of other goods, due to agents' correlated 
demand (Proposition 3). As a first step toward a more 
general treatment, we have derived a closed-form solu­
tion for the equilibrium security prices for two disjoint 
events. This involves solving for pA and pB such that 
2:;xf(pA, pB) = 0 and L;xP(pA,pB) = 0, where 
xf(pA, pB) is given by (8) and xf(pA,pB) is analo­
gous. The solution for pA is: 
PA = 
n�, (Pr,(A)J"'i 
and similarly for pB, where o:; = (1/c;)/2:i(1/cj). 
Once again we arrive at the normalized LogOP. 
Our ongoing work is investigating the general cases 
of multiple securities, disjoint or not. It is straight­
forward enough to set up markets for the general case, 
and define their equilibria. However, except for the in­
dependent case (Proposition 2), we have not yet char­
acterized the results for such markets. 
5 RELATED WORK 
The idea of using markets as a belief aggregation mech­
anism was proposed as early as forty years ago by 
Eisenberg and Gale [1959]. Inspired by the common 
method for deriving odds in horse races, they consider 
a pari-mutuel scheme where agents place bets across a 
partition of events, yielding a "consensus probability" 
equal to the proportion of the total bet on each event. 
If event H obtains, agents share the total amount 
bet in proportion to their bets on H. Agents bet 
to maximize expected payoffs, where expectation is 
with respect to their probability distribution over the 
events, subject to a budget constraint limiting their to­
tal bets. Eisenberg and Gale show that this mechanism 
yields a unique set of equilibrium probabilities, and 
Norvig [1967] presents a dynamic process for reaching 
this equilibrium through iterated bids. 
As the authors point out, however, this scheme can 
yield pathological (their word) results. For exam­
ple, if there are two bettors with equal budgets, then 
whichever has more uniform probabilities will dictate 
the results. According to Genest and Zidek [1986], the 
pari-mutuel approach to belief aggregation "has never 
enjoyed much popularity" for this reason. 
The pathological behavior, we believe, can be at­
tributed to the role of arbitrary budgets. In the ap­
proach developed here, we impose no budgets, but 
rather rely on risk aversion to limit bets to the finite 
range. 
Another exploration of markets for belief aggregation 
is Hanson's proposal for "Idea Futures" markets to 
encourage honest revelation of beliefs about future de­
velopments in science, technology, or other arenas of 
public interest [Hanson, 1995]. Although the mecha­
nism has not been analyzed as a formal protocol, it 
has been operational as a game (i.e., no real money) 
on the world-wide web since 1994. The current ver­
sion is called the "Foresight Exchange", operating at 
http: I /www. ideo sphere. com/. Hanson has also de­
scribed a scenario for employing a similar mechanism 
for coordinating computational agents [Hanson, 1991]. 
A third popular example of market-based belief ag­
gregation is the Iowa Electronic Markets (IEM) sys-
tern (http: I /www. biz. uiowa. edu/iem/), which runs 
real-money markets in uncertain political and finan­
cial propositions. Their market in the US Presidential 
election, for example, attracted wide participation and 
following. Slate magazine even used IEM as its main 
index of the election "horse race". 
In our previous work, we defined a general map­
ping from Bayesian networks to computational 
economies [Pennock and Wellman, 1996], showing that 
any joint probability distribution can be expressed as 
the competitive equilibrium of a particular configura­
tion of consumer and producer agents for a particu­
lar set of securities. In this model (called Markel­
Bayes) , consumers have preferences directly over secu­
rities. The model presented here takes a more funda­
mental approach, deriving preferences over securities 
from underlying utility for money and beliefs in the 
probability of events. In addition, the analysis here 
focuses on aggregation of beliefs, whereas the initial 
MarketBayes system-though built with aggregation 
in mind-expressly employed only one agent with par­
ticular beliefs about each conditional event. 
Although most work in economics and finance on se­
curities markets assumes (or entails) homogeneous be­
liefs, Varian [1989] presents a model where agents have 
divergent probability distributions. He considers the 
effects of belief dispersion on asset valuation and trad­
ing volume, under various preference models. 
The majority of work on belief aggregation does not in­
volve markets, focusing instead on centralized mathe­
matical pooling functions that take as input all agents' 
probability distributions and return as output a con­
sensus distribution [Benediktsson and Swain, 1992; 
French, 1985; Genest and Zidek, 1986; Ng and Abram­
son, 1992; Ng and Abramson, 1994; Weerahandi and 
Zidek, 1981; West, 1984]. Typically these models do 
not consider interaction protocols, incentives for truth 
or for participation, or how to assign "expert weights" 
to the individuals involved. Researchers have debated 
desirable properties of aggregation schemes, producing 
axiomatic arguments for some, including the standard 
linear and logarithmic (LogOP) opinion pools. 
In particular, West [1984] defines Si as the value for 
which individual i is indifferent between Di units of 
security A, and Si dollars for sure. From this and u;, 
one can derive Pr;(A). Consider an assumption that 
the group as a whole will be indifferent between the 
allocation of D = {D1, ... , DN) units of the security, 
and the certain payoff S = {S1, . . .  , SN). From the 
premise that this is true for any D (along with some 
other conditions), West proves that the group's Pr(A) 
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must obey a geometric mean: 
N 
Pr(A) = fi [Pr;(A)]w', 
i=l 
which is the unnormalized LogOP. In contrast to the 
normalized version (9), this pooling function does not 
in general yield a probability (e.g., if any agents dis­
agree, Pr(A) + Pr(A) < 1). West goes on to show 
that the degree by which the aggregate diverges from 
a probability can be used as a measure of disagreement 
among the agents.4 
However, we would make the case that the group 
should not be indifferent between S dollars and secu­
rity distribution D, unless the individual beliefs hap­
pen to be the same. In fact, the group should prefer 
the latter. The reason is that if the group has the se­
curity distribution, then there will be trading oppor­
tunities that can make everyone better off. We suspect 
that this preference can account for the normalization 
factor in the pooling procedure, a consequence of the 
market model presented here. 
6 CONCLUSION 
We have outlined a belief aggregation methodology 
based on individually rational agents (utility maximiz­
ers) trading in a competitive securities market, where 
the resultant equilibrium prices represent consensus 
beliefs. Our system is motivated from the bottom 
up: we begin with several common assumptions about 
agents (mainly that each has a subjective probability 
distribution, has risk averse utility for money, and be­
haves competitively), and seek to analyze properties of 
the implied price equilibrium. In this first report, we 
establish a few desirable properties for general mar­
kets, and provide some closed-form characterizations 
of demand and equilibrium for cases of constant risk 
aversion and limited numbers of securities. In these 
situations, agent demand appears intuitively rational 
and the price equilibrium is shown to have several ap­
pealing properties. For example, the group's aggre­
gate demand for one security is exactly that of a sin­
gle representative rational "super-agent", whose belief 
equals the group equilibrium price. Another signifi­
cant result is the equivalence (in at least some cases) of 
our price equilibrium to the consensus probability gen­
erated with the normalized logarithmic opinion pool. 
The expert weights in the standard pool coincide with 
�one of the purposes of West's investigation was to 
demonstrate the pitfalls of blindly aggregating probabil­
ities according to simple formulas (Mike West, personal 
communication) . We share this motivation, and agree with 
the idea of deriving aggregate measures from behavioral 
postulates. 
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a normalized measure of risk aversion in our model, 
providing a decision-theoretic interpretation for an of­
ten ungrounded concept. 
Future theoretical work will continue to generalize re­
sults to broader classes of risk-averse utility functions, 
and arbitrary collections of securities. We will also 
pursue formal characterizations concerning the exis­
tence of price equilibria, and the convergence to these 
equilibria via distributed bidding protocols and classi­
cal economic price adjustment. We also plan concur­
rent empirical investigations in more complex markets 
where theoretical analysis becomes intractable. Such 
economies may allow non-competitive agents and/or 
"learning" agents that update beliefs from observed 
prices; each extension will entail tests of existence, con­
vergence, and properties of aggregate prices. 
A natural practical application of belief aggregation is 
as a sub-procedure within the more general context 
of group decision-making, where agents' beliefs and 
utilities are combined to enable inference of optimal 
group decisions (say, choosing medical treatments). 
Future plans include identifying and evaluating appro­
priate generalizations in pursuit of a market-based ap­
proach to group decision-making in situations involv­
ing both asymmetric uncertainty and heterogeneous 
preferences. 
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